The SEC recently published Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (“C&DIs“) relating to the CEO pay ratio disclosure rule. This disclosure rule under Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires a public company to disclose the ratio between its CEO’s annual compensation and the median annual compensation of all other employees. The new C&DIs include guidance on the selection of an appropriate alternative compensation measure and clarify that if an alternative compensation measure is utilized to determine the median employee, the time period utilized does not have to be a full annual period. Moreover, the time period utilized does not have to include the date on which the employee population was determined. View our prior post on the SEC’s adoption of the CEO pay ratio disclosure rule here. View the full text of the C&DIs here.
Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (“ISS”) recently released the results of its annual global voting policy survey. Respondents include institutional investors, corporate issuers, as well as consultants and advisors to public companies. Survey responses provide helpful insight into the current views of influential institutional investors in addition to signaling changes to ISS voting policies. This year’s survey was light on executive compensation related questions but did provide helpful feedback on two topics. (1) Frequency of Say-on-Pay: 66 percent of institutional investors favor annual say on pay votes, consistent with current ISS policy. (2) Pay for Performance Metrics: 79 percent of institutional investors support the incorporation of financial metrics, in addition to total shareholder returns, into the ISS pay-for-performance models that identify potential misalignments between CEO pay and company performance. The three most popular alternatives were return on investment metrics (e.g., return on invested capital), return metrics (e.g., return on assets or… Continue Reading
Ninth Circuit Holds Disgorgement Remedy Applies Regardless of Personal Misconduct of Issuer’s CEO or CFO
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s ruling interpreting Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) in an enforcement action filed by the SEC alleging that defendants participated in a scheme to defraud investors by overstating revenue by millions of dollars. SOX 304 requires reimbursement of certain types of compensation, such as bonuses or equity-based compensation received by CEOs and CFOs, within 12 months of the public issuance or filing of financial statements that are required to be restated due to a reporting error that is a result of “misconduct.” Previously, the SEC had sought to apply SOX 304 against CEOs and CFOs who were alleged to be personally involved in the wrongdoing leading to the restatement. However, in this case, “it is the [misconduct of the issuer of the financial statements] that matters and not the personal misconduct of the CEO or CFO.”… Continue Reading
The IRS recently issued proposed regulations that would amend the final regulations issued under Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code. These regulations provide a number of clarifications and changes in response to practitioner comments. For instance, the regulations clarify that the separation pay plan exception may apply to a service provider who had no compensation in the year preceding the year of the separation from service. In such situations, annualized compensation from the year of separation is used. In addition, the term “eligible issuer of service recipient stock” now includes an entity for which a person is reasonably expected to begin, and actually begins, providing services within 12 months after the grant date of a stock right (i.e., an inducement option). The regulations also clarify that (i) a service provider’s right to reimbursement of reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred to pursue a bona fide legal claim against… Continue Reading
Several Federal Agencies Issue Revised Proposed Rule Prohibiting Incentive Compensation for Excessive Risk Taking by Covered Financial Institutions
Several federal agencies, including the SEC, issued a joint revised proposed rule to implement Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Proposed Rule”), which prohibits incentive-based compensation that encourages inappropriate risks by certain financial institutions. The Proposed Rule divides covered institutions into three tiers based on their average total consolidated assets. Although many aspects of the Proposed Rule are similar to the rule proposed in 2011, there are a few key differences. These differences include a new definition of incentive-based compensation that would not be considered to appropriately balance risk and rewards, a new recordkeeping requirement regarding the structure of incentive-based compensation, new requirements for deferral of incentive-based compensation, downward adjustments and clawbacks, and requirements for the structure of the institution’s compensation committee. The Proposed Rule is available here.
IRS Releases Guidance on Applicability of Code Section 162(m) to CFOs of Smaller Reporting Companies
The IRS recently released a Chief Counsel Memorandum in which the IRS concluded that the CFO of a public company, which is eligible to report under the SEC’s executive compensation disclosure rules as a “smaller reporting company,” may be subject to Code Section 162(m)’s $1 million compensation deduction limit. The limit under Code Section 162(m) applies to “covered employees,” which are a public company’s CEO and certain other highly compensated executives whose compensation is required to be disclosed pursuant to the SEC’s executive compensation disclosure rules. For larger public companies, this means the limits of Code Section 162(m) generally will apply to its CEO and its three most highly compensated executives, other than its CEO. The company’s compensation deduction for its CFO is not limited by Code Section 162(m) because the CFO’s compensation must be disclosed due to his or her position, not due to the compensation level. However, for… Continue Reading
On August 7, 2015, France’s “Law on Growth and Economic Activity” (also known as the “Macron Law”) was enacted, effective as of the same date. Among other changes, the Macron Law revised certain aspects of the tax and legal regime applicable to French-qualified restricted stock units (“RSUs”) by decreasing the applicable employer social tax percentage (payable under the new regime at vesting), reducing the minimum vesting period from two years to one year, reducing the acquisition and sale restriction periods, and providing for more favorable employee tax treatment. Importantly, the Macron Law provides that qualified RSUs can be granted under the new regime only if pursuant to an equity plan that is approved by shareholders after the August 7, 2015, effective date. It remains uncertain whether the new regime could apply to RSUs granted under a sub-plan to a shareholder-approved plan if the sub-plan is adopted by a company’s board… Continue Reading
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC“) adopted its much-anticipated final rule under Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The rule requires a public company to disclose (1) the median of the annual total compensation of all its employees, except its chief executive officer (“CEO“); (2) the annual total compensation of its CEO; and (3) the ratio of the compensation of its CEO to the median compensation of its employees. Under the rule, a company would only be required to calculate median employee compensation once every three years and generally must include all employees, including part-time, seasonal, and non-U.S. employees. Although the company may choose among methods for calculating compensation, it must disclose the method it uses and must use the same method for calculating both CEO and employee compensation. The rule is effective for the first fiscal year beginning on or after… Continue Reading
Several changes to the Australian employee share scheme tax rules became effective July 1, 2015. As enacted, the new rules reverse certain rule changes made in 2009 and provide for (i) deferring taxation of options until the time of exercise, rather than upon vesting; (ii) extending the maximum tax deferral period from seven years to 15 years from the acquisition date of a share right; and (iii) increasing the maximum share ownership limit used to determine eligibility for tax deferrals on share rights from five percent to 10 percent. In addition, the new rules provide certain tax concessions for employees of small start-up companies. Additional information on the new tax rules is available on the Australian Taxation Office’s website here.
As required by Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) recently proposed rules directing national securities exchanges and associations to establish listing standards requiring companies to adopt clawback policies. Under the proposed rules, companies would be required to develop policies that, in the event of an accounting restatement, recoup from certain current and former executive officers incentive-based compensation they would not have received based on the restatement, regardless of fault (i.e., no misconduct required). Such clawbacks would apply to excess incentive-based compensation that is tied to accounting-related metrics, stock price, or total shareholder return (with such excess determined based on an estimate of the effects on stock price or shareholder return if correct financial statements had been issued) and would apply to excess compensation received within a three-year look-back period. Companies would have discretion, however, not to… Continue Reading